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Self-­‐Reinforcing	  and	  Self-­‐Frustrating	  Decisions	  	   There	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  term	  ‘ought’	  according	  to	  which	  what	  a	  person	  ought	  to	  do	  depends	  not	  on	  how	  the	  world	  is,	  but	  on	  how	  the	  person	  believes	  the	  world	  to	  be.	  Philosophers	  typically	  isolate	  this	  as	  their	  intended	  sense	  of	  the	  term	  by	  talking	  of	  what	  people	  ‘subjectively	  ought’	  to	  do.	  Suppose,	  for	  example,	  that	  you	  are	  offered	  hors	  d’oeuvres	  at	  a	  fancy	  party.	  They	  look	  delicious,	  you	  are	  hungry,	  and	  you	  wish	  to	  please	  your	  host.	  However,	  unbeknownst	  to	  you,	  they	  are	  riddled	  with	  a	  lethal	  strain	  of	  botulism.	  A	  philosopher	  may	  say	  that,	  in	  light	  of	  your	  beliefs,	  you	  subjectively	  ought	  to	  eat	  the	  hors	  d’oeuvres,	  though	  the	  consequences	  of	  your	  doing	  so	  will	  be	  disastrous.1	  	   Our	  focus	  here	  will	  be	  on	  theories	  of	  the	  subjective	  ought	  that	  imply	  	  
Decision	  Dependence	  	  In	  some	  cases	  what	  you	  subjectively	  ought	  to	  do	  at	  a	  certain	  time	  depends	  on	  what	  you	  believe	  you	  will	  do	  at	  that	  time.	  	  We	  want	  to	  do	  three	  things.	  	   The	  first	  thing	  we	  want	  to	  do	  is	  to	  show	  that,	  in	  spite	  of	  Decision	  Dependence	  being	  prima	  facie	  odd	  (consider	  how	  odd	  it	  would	  sound	  for	  me	  to	  say	  “I	  believe	  that	  I	  will	  do	  this,	  so	  I	  ought	  to	  do	  this”,	  and	  consider	  how	  much	  yet	  odder	  it	  would	  sound	  for	  me	  to	  say	  “I	  believe	  that	  I	  will	  do	  this,	  so	  I	  ought	  not	  to	  do	  this”),	  the	  class	  of	  
                                                
1 Philosophers typically take themselves to isolate a different sense of ‘ought’ by talking of what people 
‘objectively ought to do’ – although you subjectively ought to eat the hors d’oeuvres, you objectively ought 
to decline them. What exactly is the relation between the subjective and objective oughts? This is a tricky 
question. We will not address it here. 
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theories	  that	  imply	  Decision	  Dependence	  is	  quite	  large.	  Among	  decision	  theorists,	  recent	  attention	  to	  Decision	  Dependence	  has	  been	  attention	  to	  Decision	  Dependence	  as	  a	  feature	  of	  causal	  decision	  theory.	  Among	  philosophers	  who	  work	  on	  the	  ethics	  of	  creation,	  recent	  attention	  to	  Decision	  Dependence	  has	  been	  attention	  to	  Decision	  Dependence	  as	  a	  feature	  of	  some	  actual-­‐person-­‐affecting	  theories.	  Among	  philosophers	  who	  think	  about	  prudence	  and	  welfare,	  recent	  attention	  to	  Decision	  Dependence	  has	  been	  attention	  to	  actual-­‐preference-­‐satisfying	  deontic	  theories.	  In	  Section	  1	  we	  will	  describe	  these	  three	  sorts	  of	  theory.	  In	  Section	  2	  we	  will	  formalize	  them	  and	  characterize	  them	  in	  a	  more	  general	  way.	  	   The	  second	  thing	  we	  want	  to	  do	  is	  give	  a	  new,	  and	  in	  our	  view	  compelling,	  argument	  that	  Decision	  Dependence	  is	  false.	  Many	  philosophers	  have	  felt	  there	  to	  be	  something	  problematic	  about	  Decision	  Dependence,	  but	  the	  problem	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  exceedingly	  difficult	  to	  pin	  down.	  In	  sections	  3	  and	  4	  we	  will	  review	  and	  dismiss	  some	  unsatisfactory	  arguments	  against	  Decision	  Dependence.	  In	  Sections	  5	  and	  6	  we	  will	  give	  the	  argument	  that	  satisfies	  us.	  We	  will	  argue	  that	  a	  self-­‐aware,	  epistemically	  rational	  agent	  who	  is	  guided	  by	  the	  theory	  will	  behave	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  difficult	  to	  defend,	  even	  by	  the	  lights	  of	  an	  advocate	  of	  the	  theory.	  	   The	  third	  thing	  we	  want	  to	  do	  is	  to	  explain	  how	  our	  discussion	  of	  Decision	  Dependence	  bears	  on	  the	  classic	  Newcomb	  case,	  a	  case	  that	  has	  been	  at	  the	  center	  of	  much	  theorizing	  about	  practical	  rationality	  for	  decades.	  Standard	  causal	  decision	  theory	  supports	  two-­‐boxing	  in	  the	  classic	  Newcomb	  case,	  and	  we	  have	  argued	  that	  standard	  causal	  decision	  theory	  is	  false	  –	  because	  it	  implies	  that	  the	  subjective	  ought	  is	  decision	  dependent	  in	  other	  cases.	  	  Is	  there	  a	  good	  theory	  that	  supports	  two	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boxing	  in	  the	  classic	  Newcomb	  case	  but	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  the	  subjective	  ought	  is	  decision	  dependent	  in	  other	  cases?	  In	  Section	  7	  we	  will	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  not.	  This	  is	  a	  happy	  day	  for	  one-­‐boxers.	  	  
1.	  Three	  Theories	  that	  Imply	  Decision	  Dependence	  	   Here	  is	  one	  example	  of	  a	  theory	  that	  says	  that,	  in	  some	  cases,	  what	  you	  subjectively	  ought	  to	  do	  depends	  on	  what	  you	  believe	  you	  will	  do.	  
	  
Satisfy	  Anticipated	  Desires	  (SAD)	  Other	  things	  being	  equal,	  you	  subjectively	  ought	  to	  strive	  to	  satisfy	  desires	  that	  you	  anticipate	  having.	  If	  you	  now	  believe	  that	  you	  will	  later	  desire	  that	  you	  acted	  a	  certain	  way	  now	  then,	  other	  things	  being	  equal,	  you	  subjectively	  ought	  to	  act	  that	  way	  now.2	  If	  this	  theory	  is	  correct	  then	  the	  subjective	  ought	  will	  be	  decision-­‐dependent	  in	  some	  cases	  in	  which	  you	  believe	  that	  your	  present	  decision	  will	  affect	  what	  desires	  you	  later	  have.	  For	  example:	  	  Nice	  Choices	  at	  the	  Spa	  Aromatherapy	  or	  body-­‐wrap	  –	  which	  is	  it	  to	  be?	  You	  believe	  that,	  whichever	  you	  choose,	  you	  will	  be	  very	  glad	  you	  chose	  it.	  Mid-­‐aromatherapy,	  the	  aromatherapy	  will	  seem	  self-­‐evidently	  superior.	  Mid-­‐body-­‐wrap,	  the	  body-­‐wrap	  will	  seem	  self-­‐evidently	  superior.	  	  	  If	  you	  believe	  that	  you	  will	  choose	  the	  aromatherapy	  then	  you	  believe	  that	  you	  will	  later	  think	  it	  most	  desirable	  that	  you	  chose	  the	  aromatherapy,	  so,	  by	  SAD,	  you	  
                                                
2 This is the sort of idea that seems to underlie “I’ll be glad I did it” reasoning – “I’ll be glad I did it, so, 
other things being equal, I ought to do it.” See Harman (2009).  
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subjectively	  ought	  to	  choose	  the	  aromatherapy.	  If	  you	  believe	  that	  you	  will	  choose	  the	  body-­‐wrap	  then	  you	  believe	  that	  you	  will	  later	  think	  it	  most	  desirable	  that	  you	  chose	  the	  body-­‐wrap,	  so,	  by	  SAD,	  you	  subjectively	  ought	  to	  choose	  the	  body-­‐wrap.	  	   Here	  is	  another	  example	  of	  a	  theory	  that	  says	  that,	  sometimes,	  what	  you	  ought	  to	  do	  depends	  on	  what	  you	  believe	  you	  will	  do:	  	  
Satisfy	  the	  Interests	  of	  Children	  and	  Kids	  (SICK)	  Other	  things	  being	  equal,	  you	  ought	  to	  strive	  to	  do	  what	  you	  believe	  will	  be	  good	  for	  your	  children.	  If	  you	  now	  believe	  that	  it	  will	  turn	  out	  to	  have	  been	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  one	  of	  your	  children	  that	  you	  acted	  a	  certain	  way	  now,	  then,	  other	  things	  being	  equal,	  you	  subjectively	  ought	  to	  act	  that	  way.3	  If	  this	  theory	  is	  correct	  then	  the	  subjective	  ought	  will	  be	  decision-­‐dependent	  in	  some	  cases	  in	  which	  you	  believe	  that	  your	  present	  decision	  will	  affect	  what	  children	  you	  later	  have.	  	  For	  example:	  	  Nice	  Choices	  at	  the	  Adoption	  Agency	  Annie	  or	  Beth	  –	  who	  is	  it	  to	  be?	  You	  believe	  that	  you	  are	  a	  good	  parent.	  It	  is	  better	  for	  Annie	  that	  you	  adopt	  Annie,	  better	  for	  Beth	  that	  you	  adopt	  Beth.	  	  If	  you	  believe	  that	  you	  will	  adopt	  Annie	  then	  you	  believe	  that	  it	  will	  turn	  out	  to	  have	  been	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  one	  of	  your	  children	  (Annie)	  that	  you	  adopt	  Annie,	  so,	  by	  SICK,	  you	  subjectively	  ought	  to	  adopt	  Annie.	  If	  you	  believe	  that	  you	  will	  adopt	  Beth	  then	  you	  believe	  that	  it	  will	  turn	  out	  to	  have	  been	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  one	  of	  your	  
                                                
3 See Hare (2007) for a discussion of theories of this general kind. 
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children	  (Beth)	  that	  you	  adopt	  Beth,	  so,	  by	  SICK,	  you	  subjectively	  ought	  to	  adopt	  Beth.	  	   And	  here	  is	  a	  third	  example	  of	  a	  theory	  that	  says	  that,	  sometimes,	  what	  you	  ought	  to	  do	  depends	  on	  what	  you	  believe	  you	  will	  do:	  	  
Accept	  What	  you	  Cannot	  Control,	  With	  Appropriate	  Regard	  for	  
Dependencies	  (AWCCWARD)	  If	  you	  believe	  that	  things	  beyond	  your	  causal	  influence	  are	  such	  that,	  supposing	  they	  are	  the	  way	  they	  are,	  it	  is	  most	  desirable	  that	  you	  act	  a	  certain	  way,	  then	  you	  subjectively	  ought	  to	  act	  that	  way.4	  If	  this	  theory	  is	  correct	  then	  the	  subjective	  ought	  will	  be	  decision-­‐dependent	  in	  some	  cases	  in	  which	  your	  beliefs	  about	  how	  things	  beyond	  your	  control	  are	  depend	  on	  your	  beliefs	  about	  what	  you	  will	  do.	  Consider:	  	   The	  Nice	  Demon	  Two	  opaque	  crates	  are	  placed	  before	  you.	  You	  get	  to	  take	  one	  and	  only	  one	  of	  them.	  Which	  should	  you	  take?	  You	  are	  sure	  that	  money	  has	  been	  placed	  in	  the	  boxes	  by	  a	  demon,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  prediction	  she	  made	  about	  which	  crate	  you	  would	  later	  take:	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   in	  A	   	   in	  B	   	  
If	  she	  predicted	  you	  would	  take	  Crate	  A,	  then	  she	  put	  	  	  $1000	  	   $0	  
If	  she	  predicted	  you	  would	  take	  Crate	  B,	  then	  she	  put	   $0	   	   $1000	  The	  demon	  has	  shown	  herself	  to	  be	  fiendishly	  good	  at	  making	  predictions.	  You	  are	  sure	  (or,	  at	  least,	  as	  close	  to	  sure	  as	  makes	  no	  difference)	  that	  it	  will	  turn	  out	  that	  she	  made	  the	  right	  one.	  	  
                                                
4 This idea underlies all versions of causal decision theory. We will discuss it in detail in the next section. 
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If	  you	  believe	  that	  you	  will	  take	  Crate	  A	  then	  you	  believe	  that	  things	  beyond	  your	  causal	  influence	  are	  this	  way:	  there’s	  $1000	  in	  Crate	  A	  and	  nothing	  in	  Crate	  B.	  Supposing	  there’s	  $1000	  in	  Crate	  A	  and	  nothing	  in	  Crate	  B,	  it	  is	  desirable	  that	  you	  take	  Crate	  A.	  So,	  by	  AWCCWARD,	  you	  subjectively	  ought	  to	  take	  Crate	  A.	  If	  you	  believe	  that	  you	  will	  take	  crateB	  then	  you	  believe	  that	  things	  beyond	  your	  causal	  influence	  are	  a	  different	  way:	  there’s	  nothing	  in	  Crate	  A	  and	  $1000	  in	  Crate	  B.	  Supposing	  there’s	  nothing	  in	  Crate	  A	  and	  $1000	  in	  Crate	  B,	  it	  is	  desirable	  that	  you	  take	  Crate	  B.	  So,	  by	  AWCCWARD,	  you	  subjectively	  ought	  to	  take	  Crate	  B.5	  	  
2.	  A	  Formal	  Interlude	  	   One	  achievement	  of	  twentieth	  century	  philosophy	  and	  economics	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  formal	  tools	  that	  allow	  us	  to	  describe	  theories	  of	  the	  subjective	  ought	  very	  precisely.	  The	  benefit	  to	  using	  these	  tools	  is	  accuracy.	  The	  cost	  is	  obscure	  technicality.	  If	  you	  have	  no	  patience	  for	  obscure	  technicality	  then	  please	  skip	  ahead	  to	  Section	  3.	  	   We	  will	  begin	  with	  AWCCWARD.	  Its	  natural	  formalization	  is	  famous	  –	  known	  as	  
causal	  decision	  theory.6	  	   As	  a	  background,	  let’s	  suppose	  that	  your	  present	  doxastic	  (which	  is	  to	  say	  belief-­‐
like)	  attitudes	  can	  be	  represented	  by	  a	  credence	  function,	  C,	  from	  propositions	  to	  real	  numbers	  between	  0	  and	  1	  –	  the	  numbers	  representing	  how	  likely	  you	  think	  it	  
                                                
5 There is in fact a third possibility, namely that you assign probability 0.5 to your taking Crate A and 
probability 0.5 to your taking Crate B.  In this case, taking Crate A and taking Crate B look equally good, 
and so AWCCWARD permits you to take either Crate (for formal details, see the next section).  Note 
however that the doxastic state of assigning probability 0.5 to your taking Crate A and 0.5 to taking Crate B 
is an unstable equilibrium, in the sense that if you become any more confident that you will take Crate A, 
then AWCCWARD recommends taking Crate A, and similary, mutatis mutandis, for Crate B.  See Skyrms 
(1990) and Arntzenius (2008) for details.   
6 There are many different versions of causal decision theory. We will follow Lewis (1981). 
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that	  the	  propositions	  are	  true.	  And	  let’s	  suppose	  that	  your	  present	  conative	  (which	  is	  to	  say	  desire-­‐like)	  attitudes	  can	  be	  represented	  by	  a	  function,	  U,	  from	  propositions	  to	  real	  numbers	  –	  the	  numbers	  representing	  how	  desirable	  you	  think	  it	  that	  the	  propositions	  be	  true.	  And	  let’s	  suppose	  that	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  you	  might	  act	  now	  can	  be	  represented	  by	  a	  set	  of	  propositions	  A.	  Call	  the	  propositions	  in	  A	  act-­‐
propositions.	  	  	   Now	  let	  D	  be	  a	  set	  of	  propositions	  concerning	  how	  things	  beyond	  your	  control	  are.	  Let	  D	  be	  exclusive	  (no	  two	  propositions	  in	  D	  can	  both	  be	  true),	  exhaustive	  (all	  propositions	  about	  how	  things	  beyond	  your	  control	  are	  entail	  the	  disjunction	  of	  the	  propositions	  in	  D)	  and	  relevant	  (for	  all	  act-­‐propositions	  a,	  all	  propositions	  d	  in	  D,	  and	  all	  propositions	  r,	  if	  aÙd	  is	  consistent	  with	  both	  r	  and	  Ør	  then	  U(aÙdÙr)	  =	  
U(aÙdÙØr).)	  Call	  the	  propositions	  in	  D	  dependency	  hypotheses.	  	  	   Where	  d	  is	  a	  variable	  ranging	  over	  dependency	  hypotheses,	  we	  define	  the	  
causal	  expected	  utility	  (ECU)	  of	  an	  act	  proposition,	  a,	  like	  this:	  	   	   	   	   ECU(a)	  =	  ∑d(C(d).U(aÙd))	  And	  we	  say	  that	  you	  subjectively	  ought	  to	  make	  true	  the	  act-­‐proposition	  with	  highest	  	  causal	  expected	  utility.	  	   To	  get	  a	  feel	  for	  how	  to	  apply	  causal	  decision	  theory,	  consider	  the	  Nice	  Demon	  case.	  In	  that	  case	  there	  are	  two	  act-­‐propositions:	  	   	   	   	   aA:	  	   You	  take	  Crate	  A.	  	   	   	   	   aB:	  	   You	  take	  Crate	  B.	  and	  two	  relevant	  dependency	  hypotheses7:	  
                                                
7 This is a slight idealization.  In realistic cases, the space of dependency hypotheses will need to be much 
more fine-grained in order to satisfy relevance.  Here, however, the idealization is harmless. 
 8 
	   	   	   	   d$1000inA:	  There’s	  $1000	  in	  Crate	  A,	  nothing	  Crate	  B.	  	   	   	   	   d$1000inB:	  There’s	  nothing	  in	  Crate	  A,	  $1000	  in	  Crate	  B.	  If	  you	  believe	  that	  you	  will	  take	  Crate	  A,	  then	  C(d$1000inA)=1	  and	  C(d$1000inB)=0,	  so	  ECU(aA)	  =	  U(you	  get	  $1000)	  and	  ECU(aB)	  =	  U(you	  get	  nothing).	  So,	  supposing	  that	  you	  like	  money,	  you	  subjectively	  ought	  to	  make	  proposition	  aA	  true,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  that	  you	  subjectively	  ought	  to	  take	  Crate	  A.	  If	  you	  believe	  that	  you	  will	  take	  Crate	  B,	  then	  C(d$1000inA)=0	  and	  C(d$1000inB)=1,	  so	  ECU(aA)	  =	  U(you	  get	  nothing),	  and	  ECU(aB)	  =	  U(you	  get	  $1000).	  So,	  supposing	  that	  you	  like	  money,	  you	  subjectively	  ought	  to	  make	  proposition	  aB	  true,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  that	  you	  subjectively	  ought	  to	  take	  Crate	  B.	  	   Causal	  decision	  theory	  is	  standardly	  contrasted	  with	  evidential	  decision	  theory,	  which	  says	  that	  you	  subjectively	  ought	  to	  make	  true	  the	  act-­‐proposition	  with	  highest	  evidential	  expected	  utility	  (EEU)	  –	  defined	  in	  this	  way:	  	  	   	   	   	   EEU(a)	  =	  ∑d(C(d/a).U(aÙd))	  Where	  ‘C(d/a)’	  refers	  to	  your	  conditional	  credence	  in	  dependency	  hypothesis	  d,	  given	  that	  you	  make	  true	  act-­‐proposition	  a.	  	   Evidential	  theory	  says	  that	  in	  this	  case,	  irrespective	  of	  what	  you	  believe	  you	  will	  do,	  there	  is	  nothing	  that	  you	  subjectively	  ought	  to	  do.	  Irrespective	  of	  what	  you	  believe	  you	  will	  do,	  C(d$1000inA/aA)	  =	  1,	  C(d$1000inA/aB)	  =	  0,	  C(d$1000inB/aB)	  =	  1,	  C(d$1000inB/aA)	  =	  0.	  So,	  irrespective	  of	  what	  you	  believe	  you	  will	  do,	  EEU(aA)	  =	  U(you	  get	  $1000)	  and	  EEU(aB)	  =	  U(you	  get	  $1000).	  The	  two	  options	  have	  the	  same	  evidential	  expected	  utility.	  	   So	  much	  for	  AWCCWARD.	  Now	  for	  the	  formalization	  of	  SAD.	  	  Let	  ‘futU’	  refer	  to	  the	  proposition	  that	  your	  future	  desires	  will	  be	  represented	  by	  utility	  function	  U.	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Formal	  SAD	  says	  that,	  other	  things	  being	  equal,	  you	  ought	  to	  make	  true	  the	  act-­‐proposition	  with	  highest	  expected-­‐expected	  utility	  (E2U)	  –	  defined	  in	  this	  way	  (for	  those	  sympathetic	  to	  causalist	  reasoning):	  	   	   	   	   E2U(a)	  =	  	  ∑U	  C(futU).ECU(a)	  or	  in	  this	  way	  (for	  those	  sympathetic	  to	  evidentialist	  reasoning):	  	   	   	   	   E2U(a)	  =	  	  ∑U	  C(futU).EEU(a)	  where	  U	  is	  a	  variable	  that	  ranges	  over	  utility	  functions.	  	  In	  prose,	  the	  expected-­‐expected	  utility	  of	  an	  act	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  possible	  (causal	  or	  evidential)	  expected	  utilities	  of	  that	  act,	  given	  each	  of	  the	  different	  utility	  functions	  you	  might	  have	  in	  the	  future,	  weighted	  by	  your	  credence	  that	  you	  will	  in	  fact	  have	  that	  utility	  function	  in	  the	  future.	  	  Formal	  SAD	  says	  that	  you	  subjectively	  ought	  to	  perform	  the	  act	  with	  highest	  expected-­‐expected	  utility.	  	   To	  get	  a	  feel	  for	  how	  to	  apply	  formal	  SAD,	  look	  again	  at	  Nice	  Choices	  at	  the	  Spa.	  In	  that	  case	  there	  are	  two	  act	  propositions:	  	   	   	   	   aA:	  You	  choose	  the	  aromatherapy	  	   	   	   	   aB:	  You	  choose	  the	  body-­‐wrap	  and	  two	  utility	  functions	  that	  represent	  desires	  that	  you	  may	  later	  have	  	   	   	   	   UA:	  a	  function	  such	  that	  UA(aA)	  >	  UA(aB)	  	   	   	   	   UB:	  a	  function	  such	  that	  UB(aB)	  >	  UB(aA)	  If	  you	  believe	  that	  you	  will	  choose	  the	  aromatherapy,	  then	  C(futUA)	  =	  1	  and	  C(futUB)	  =	  0.	  It	  follows	  that	  E2U(aA)	  >	  E2U(aB),	  and	  you	  ought	  to	  choose	  the	  aromatherapy.	  If	  you	  believe	  that	  you	  will	  choose	  the	  body-­‐wrap	  then	  C(propUA)	  =	  0	  and	  C(propUB)	  =	  1.	  It	  follows	  that	  E2U(aB)	  >	  E2U(aA),	  and	  you	  ought	  to	  choose	  the	  body-­‐wrap.	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   The	  contrast	  theory	  here,	  the	  theory	  that	  stands	  in	  the	  same	  relationship	  to	  formal	  SAD	  as	  evidential	  decision	  theory	  stands	  in	  to	  causal	  decision	  theory,	  is	  
future	  satisfactionism.	  This	  says,	  roughly,	  that	  other	  things	  being	  equal	  you	  ought	  to	  maximize	  your	  expected	  future	  state	  of	  satisfaction.	  Formally,	  you	  ought	  to	  make	  true	  the	  act-­‐proposition	  with	  highest	  expected	  satisfaction	  (ES)	  –	  defined	  in	  this	  way	  (for	  those	  sympathetic	  to	  causalist	  reasoning):	  	   	   	   	   ES(a)	  =	  	  ∑U	  C(futU/a).ECU(a)	  or	  in	  this	  way	  (for	  those	  sympathetic	  to	  evidentialist	  reasoning):	  	   	   	   	   ES(a)	  =	  	  ∑U	  C(futU/a).EEU(a)	  where	  U	  is	  a	  variable	  ranging	  over	  utility	  functions.	  	   	  	  In	  this	  case,	  irrespective	  of	  what	  you	  believe	  you	  will	  do,	  C(futUA/aA)	  =	  1,	  C(futUA/aB)	  =	  0,	  C(futUB/aB)	  =	  1,	  C(futUB/aA)	  =	  0.	  So,	  irrespective	  of	  what	  you	  believe	  you	  will	  do,	  ES(aA)	  =	  UA(aA)	  and	  ES(aB)	  =	  UB(aB).	  So,	  irrespective	  of	  what	  you	  believe	  you	  will	  do,	  if	  UA(aA)	  >	  UB(aB)	  then	  you	  ought	  to	  choose	  the	  massage,	  if	  UA(aA)	  =	  UB(aB)	  then	  there’s	  nothing	  that	  you	  ought	  to,	  if	  UA(aA)	  <	  UB(aB)	  then	  you	  ought	  to	  choose	  the	  aromatherapy.	  	   Finally,	  let’s	  move	  to	  the	  formal	  representation	  of	  SICK.	  First	  we	  suppose	  that,	  just	  as	  we	  can	  represent	  your	  conative	  attitudes	  with	  a	  utility	  function,	  so	  we	  can	  represent	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  various	  children	  you	  might	  have	  with	  utility	  functions.	  Let	  ‘futcU’	  refer	  to	  the	  proposition	  that	  your	  future	  child	  has	  interests	  represented	  by	  utility	  function	  U.	  Formal	  SICK	  says	  that,	  all	  other	  things	  being	  equal,	  you	  ought	  to	  make	  true	  the	  act-­‐proposition	  with	  highest	  expected-­‐expected	  utility	  for	  your	  child	  (E2UK)	  –	  defined	  in	  this	  way	  (for	  those	  sympathetic	  to	  causalist	  reasoning):	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   E2UK(a)	  =	  	  ∑U	  C(futcU).ECU(a)	  or	  in	  this	  way	  (for	  those	  sympathetic	  to	  evidentialist	  reasoning):	  	   	   	   	   E2UK(a)	  =	  	  ∑U	  C(futcU).EEU(a)	  	   To	  get	  a	  feel	  for	  how	  to	  apply	  formal	  SICK,	  look	  again	  at	  the	  Nice	  Choices	  at	  the	  Adoption	  Agency	  case.	  In	  that	  case	  there	  are	  two	  act	  propositions:	  	   	   	   	   aA:	  You	  adopt	  Annie	  	   	   	   	   aB:	  You	  adopt	  Beth	  and	  two	  utility	  functions,	  representing	  the	  interests	  of	  Annie	  and	  Beth	  	   	   	   	   UA:	  a	  function	  such	  that	  UA(aA)	  >	  UA(aB)	  	   	   	   	   UB:	  a	  function	  such	  that	  UB(aB)	  >	  UB(aA)	  If	  you	  believe	  that	  you	  will	  adopt	  Annie,	  then	  C(futcUA)	  =	  1	  and	  C(futcUB)	  =	  0.	  So	  E2UK(aA)	  >	  E2UK(aB),	  so	  you	  ought	  to	  adopt	  Annie.	  If	  you	  believe	  that	  you	  will	  adopt	  Beth	  then	  C(futcUA)	  =	  0	  and	  C(futcUB)	  =	  1.	  So	  E2UK(aB)	  >	  E2UK(aA),	  so	  you	  ought	  to	  adopt	  Beth.	  	   The	  contrast	  theory	  for	  SICK	  may	  be	  called	  Welfare	  Maximization.	  It	  says	  roughly	  that	  you	  should	  maximize	  the	  expected	  well-­‐being	  of	  your	  future	  child	  (where	  'your	  future	  child'	  is	  read	  non-­‐rigidly).	  Formally,	  you	  ought	  to	  make	  true	  the	  act	  proposition	  with	  highest	  expected	  satisfaction	  for	  your	  child	  (ESK)	  –	  defined	  in	  this	  way	  (for	  those	  sympathetic	  to	  causalist	  reasoning):	  	  	   	   	   	   ESK(a)	  =	  	  ∑U	  C(futcU/a).ECU(a)	  Or	  in	  this	  way	  (for	  those	  sympathetic	  to	  evidentialist	  reasoning:	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   ESK(a)	  =	  ∑U	  C(futcU/a).EEU(a)	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   As	  before,	  this	  theory	  says	  that	  what	  you	  subjectively	  ought	  to	  do	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  what	  you	  believe	  you	  will	  do.	  In	  this	  case,	  irrespective	  of	  what	  you	  believe	  you	  will	  do,	  if	  UA(aA)	  >	  UB(aB)	  then	  you	  ought	  to	  adopt	  Annie,	  if	  UA(aA)	  =	  UB(aB)	  then	  there’s	  nothing	  that	  you	  ought	  to,	  if	  UA(aA)	  <	  UB(aB)	  then	  you	  ought	  to	  adopt	  Beth.	  	  
	  
3.	  A	  First	  Pass	  at	  Pinning	  Down	  the	  Worry:	  Decisions	  will	  be	  Unstable	  in	  Self-­‐
Frustrating	  Cases	  	   So	  much	  for	  the	  formalization	  of	  SAD,	  SICK	  and	  AWKWAARD.	  Is	  it	  a	  defect	  in	  these	  theories	  that	  they	  entail	  that	  there	  are	  situations	  in	  which	  the	  subjective	  ought	  is	  decision-­‐dependent?	  To	  get	  a	  grip	  on	  the	  question	  it	  will	  be	  helpful	  to	  have	  a	  way	  of	  representing	  and	  sorting	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  subjective	  ought	  might	  be	  decision-­‐dependent	  in	  different	  situations.	  	  (Note	  that	  our	  arguments	  in	  succeeding	  sections	  of	  the	  paper	  will	  not	  depend	  on	  these	  diagrams;	  they	  are	  for	  illustrative	  purposes	  only.)	  	   For	  situations	  in	  which	  you	  have	  two	  options	  available	  to	  you,	  A	  and	  B,	  here	  is	  a	  simple	  way	  to	  represent	  decision-­‐dependence:	  First,	  let	  points	  on	  the	  unit	  interval	  represent	  credences	  that	  you	  might	  have	  concerning	  what	  you	  will	  do	  –	  with	  distance	  from	  the	  right	  end	  representing	  your	  credence	  that	  you	  will	  do	  A,	  distance	  from	  the	  left	  end	  representing	  your	  credence	  that	  you	  will	  do	  B	  (intuitively:	  the	  closer	  the	  point	  to	  the	  ‘A’	  in	  the	  diagram,	  the	  more	  confident	  you	  are	  that	  you	  will	  do	  A,	  the	  closer	  the	  point	  to	  the	  ‘B’	  in	  the	  diagram,	  the	  more	  confident	  you	  are	  that	  you	  will	  do	  B).	  Next,	  represent	  what	  a	  theory	  says	  about	  a	  situation	  by	  marking	  regions	  of	  the	  interval.	  So,	  for	  example:	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Fig.	  1	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  Fig.	  2	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Do	  B!	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Do	  A!	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Do	  B!	   	  	   	  	  	  	   	  A	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  B	   	   	   A	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  B	  	   	   	  	  	  	  0.25	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.75	   	   	   	  	  	  	  The	  indicated	  point	  in	  Fig.	  1	  represents	  the	  attitude	  of	  having	  credence	  0.75	  that	  you	  will	  do	  A,	  and	  credence	  0.25	  that	  you	  will	  do	  B.	  Fig.	  2	  represents	  a	  theory	  that	  says	  of	  a	  situation,	  roughly,	  that	  you	  ought	  to	  do	  A	  unless	  you	  are	  confident	  about	  what	  you	  will	  do,	  in	  which	  case	  you	  ought	  to	  do	  B.	  	   A	  similar	  method	  works	  for	  three-­‐option	  cases.	  First,	  let	  points	  within	  an	  isosceles	  triangle,	  with	  height	  1	  and	  base-­‐length	  1,	  represent	  doxastic	  attitudes	  that	  you	  might	  have	  about	  what	  you	  will	  do	  –	  with	  horizontal	  distance	  from	  the	  right	  side	  representing	  your	  credence	  that	  you	  will	  do	  A,	  horizontal	  distance	  from	  the	  left	  side	  representing	  your	  credence	  that	  you	  will	  do	  B,	  vertical	  distance	  from	  the	  base	  representing	  your	  credence	  that	  you	  will	  do	  C.	  Next	  represent	  what	  a	  theory	  says	  about	  a	  particular	  case	  by	  marking	  regions	  of	  the	  triangle.	  So,	  for	  example:	  	   	  	  
Fig.	  3	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Fig.	  4	   	   	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  C	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  C	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	   	   	   	  	   	   	   0.20	   	  	  0.35	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Do	  A!	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.45	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Do	  C!	   	   	  	   	   	   	  	   	  	  	   A	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  B	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  A	   	   	   	   	  	  B	  	   	   	   	  
 14 
	  The	  indicated	  point	  in	  Fig.	  3	  represents	  the	  attitude	  of	  having	  credence	  0.35	  that	  you	  will	  do	  A,	  credence	  0.2	  that	  you	  will	  do	  B,	  and	  credence	  0.45	  that	  you	  will	  do	  C.	  Fig.	  4	  represents	  a	  theory	  that	  says	  of	  a	  situation,	  roughly,	  that	  you	  ought	  to	  do	  A	  unless	  you	  are	  confident	  about	  what	  you	  will	  do,	  in	  which	  case	  you	  ought	  to	  do	  C.	  	   Now,	  two	  forms	  of	  decision-­‐dependence	  are	  particularly	  interesting.	  The	  first	  is	  
self-­‐reinforcing	  decision-­‐dependence.	  This	  comes	  about	  when	  a	  theory	  says	  of	  a	  situation	  that,	  as	  your	  confidence	  that	  you	  will	  take	  any	  particular	  option	  increases,	  so	  it	  becomes	  the	  case	  that	  you	  ought	  to	  take	  that	  option.	  Whatever	  you	  believe	  you	  will	  do,	  you	  ought	  to	  do	  it.	  The	  cases	  we	  have	  seen	  so	  far	  (Nice	  Choices	  at	  the	  Spa,	  Nice	  Choices	  at	  the	  Adoption	  Agency,	  The	  Nice	  Demon)	  have	  all	  been	  cases	  of	  self-­‐reinforcing	  decision-­‐dependence,	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  recommendations	  of	  SAD,	  SICK	  and	  CDT	  look	  like	  this:	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	   Fig.	  5	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Do	  A!	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Do	  B!	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  A	   	   	   	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  B	   	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	   	  	  The	  second	  is	  self-­‐frustrating	  decision-­‐dependence.	  This	  comes	  about	  when	  a	  theory	  says	  of	  a	  situation	  that,	  as	  your	  confidence	  that	  you	  will	  take	  any	  particular	  option	  increases,	  so	  it	  becomes	  the	  case	  that	  you	  ought	  not	  to	  take	  that	  option.	  Consider:	  	   Nasty	  Choices	  at	  the	  Spa	  Abdominal-­‐acupuncture	  or	  bee-­‐sting-­‐therapy	  –	  which	  is	  it	  to	  be?	  You	  believe	  that,	  whichever	  you	  choose,	  you	  will	  wish	  that	  you	  had	  chosen	  the	  other.	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   Nasty	  Choices	  at	  the	  Adoption	  Agency	  Annie	  or	  Beth	  –	  who	  is	  it	  to	  be?	  You	  believe	  that	  you	  are	  a	  bad	  parent.	  It	  is	  better	  for	  Annie	  that	  you	  adopt	  Beth,	  better	  for	  Beth	  that	  you	  adopt	  Annie.	  	  The	  Nasty	  Demon	  Crate	  A	  or	  Crate	  B?	  This	  time	  you	  are	  sure	  that	  the	  demon	  wanted	  to	  frustrate	  you:	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   in	  A	   	   in	  B	   	  
If	  she	  predicted	  you	  would	  take	  Crate	  A,	  then	  she	  put	  	  	  $0	   	   $1000	  
If	  she	  predicted	  you	  would	  take	  Crate	  B,	  then	  she	  put	   $1000	  	   $0	  
In	  these	  cases	  SAD,	  SICK	  and	  CDT	  say	  that	  whatever	  you	  believe	  you	  will	  do,	  you	  ought	  not	  to	  do	  it.	  Their	  recommendations	  look	  like	  this:	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Fig.	  6	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Do	  B!	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Do	  A!	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  A	   	   	   	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  B	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	   	  	   Now,	  as	  many	  philosophers	  (Gibbard	  and	  Harper	  1978,	  Weirich	  1985,	  1988,	  Harper	  1985,	  1986,	  Richter	  1984,	  Skyrms	  1986,	  Sobel	  1994)	  have	  observed,	  in	  cases	  like	  this,	  if	  you	  resolve	  to	  be	  guided	  by	  the	  decision-­‐dependent	  theory,	  and	  you	  are	  self-­‐aware,	  then	  any	  decision	  you	  make	  will	  be	  in	  a	  certain	  sense	  unstable.	  Whatever	  you	  decide	  to	  do,	  your	  deciding	  to	  do	  it	  will	  give	  you	  confidence	  that	  you	  will	  do	  it,	  and	  confidence	  that	  you	  will	  do	  it	  will	  show	  you	  that	  you	  ought	  to	  do	  the	  other	  thing,	  which	  (given	  your	  resolve	  to	  be	  guided	  by	  the	  decision-­‐dependent	  theory)	  will	  lead	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you	  to	  decide	  to	  do	  the	  other	  thing,	  which	  will	  give	  you	  confidence	  that	  you	  will	  do	  the	  other	  thing…	  and	  so	  on.	  You	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  stand	  by	  your	  decisions.	  	   Some	  philosophers8	  have	  taken	  this	  observation	  to	  be	  an	  objection	  to	  theories	  that	  imply	  decision	  dependence,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  so	  obvious	  why	  there	  is	  anything	  objectionable	  about	  it.	  First,	  it	  is	  not	  obvious	  why	  we	  should	  demand	  of	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  subjective	  ought	  that	  someone	  who	  tries	  to	  comply	  with	  its	  demands	  should	  always	  be	  able	  to	  commit	  themselves	  to	  a	  decision	  in	  this	  sense.	  Maybe	  a	  lack	  of	  commitment	  to	  your	  decisions	  is	  precisely	  the	  right	  attitude	  to	  have	  in	  these	  strange	  cases.9	  	   Second,	  it	  is	  not	  obvious	  that	  if	  you	  try	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  theories	  in	  these	  situations,	  then	  you	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  commit	  yourself	  to	  a	  decision.	  Your	  decision	  to	  do	  A	  will	  make	  it	  the	  case	  that	  you	  subjectively	  ought	  to	  do	  B	  if	  your	  decision	  to	  do	  A	  gives	  you	  confidence	  that	  you	  will	  wind	  up	  doing	  A.	  But	  your	  decision	  to	  do	  A	  will	  give	  you	  confidence	  that	  you	  will	  wind	  up	  doing	  A	  only	  if	  you	  are	  confident	  that	  the	  decision	  is	  final.	  And	  in	  these	  self-­‐frustrating	  cases,	  where	  no	  decision	  is	  stable,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that,	  if	  you	  are	  aware	  that	  you	  are	  guided	  by	  a	  theory	  that	  implies	  decision	  dependence,	  you	  should	  ever	  be	  confident	  that	  your	  decision	  is	  final.	  Granted	  there	  is	  something	  strange	  about	  deciding	  to	  do	  A	  while	  remaining	  no	  more	  confident	  that	  you	  will	  A	  than	  that	  you	  will	  do	  B.	  But	  again,	  this	  may	  be	  exactly	  the	  right	  attitude	  to	  have	  in	  these	  strange,	  self-­‐frustrating	  cases.	  	  
                                                
8 Richter (1984) presses this objection against CDT.  Harper (1985, 1986) and Weirich (1988) propose 
modifications to CDT to deal with cases of decision instability, indicating that they agree with Richter that 
this is a problem for standard CDT.   
9 This is just to say that it is unclear why ratifiability should matter.  In the terminology of Jeffrey (1983), 
an act is said to be ratifiable iff it looks at least as good as the alternatives even once you become certain 
that you will perform it (that is, iff that act looks at least as good as the alternatives according to your 
credences, conditional on the proposition that you perform it).  We see no compelling reason to think that 
the true theory of rational decision-making should recommend only ratifiable acts.   
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   Finally,	  while	  neither	  the	  decision	  to	  do	  A	  nor	  the	  decision	  to	  do	  B	  is	  stable,	  the	  decision	  to	  perform	  the	  so	  called	  ‘mixed’	  act	  of	  doing	  A	  with	  probability	  0.5	  and	  doing	  B	  with	  probability	  0.5	  may	  be	  stable.	  	  This	  is	  because,	  when	  you	  are	  0.5	  confident	  that	  you	  will	  do	  A	  and	  0.5	  confident	  that	  you	  will	  do	  B,	  all	  of	  the	  options	  (A,	  B,	  and	  the	  mixed	  act)	  have	  the	  same	  causal	  expected	  utility;	  they	  look	  equally	  good,	  according	  to	  CDT.	  	  So,	  even	  if	  one	  thinks	  that	  rational	  people	  must	  make	  stable	  decisions,	  this	  does	  not	  straightforwardly	  show	  you	  cannot	  be	  rational	  and	  guided	  by	  CDT	  in	  these	  cases.	  There	  may	  be	  a	  stable	  decision	  to	  be	  made.10	  	  	  	  	  
	  4.	  Second	  Pass:	  Don’t	  the	  Theories	  Just	  Say	  Counter-­‐Intuitive	  Things	  About	  
Asymmetric	  Self-­‐Frustrating	  Cases?	  	   Another	  worry	  (one	  that	  has	  received	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  attention	  recently11)	  is	  that	  causal	  decision	  theory	  simply	  says	  the	  wrong	  thing	  about	  what	  you	  ought	  to	  do	  in	  self-­‐frustrating	  cases	  of	  a	  particular	  kind.	  Consider:	  	   	  The	  Asymmetrically	  Nasty	  Demon12	  Crate	  A	  or	  Crate	  B?	  Again	  you	  are	  sure	  that	  the	  demon	  wanted	  to	  frustrate	  you.	  But	  this	  time	  you	  are	  sure	  that	  she	  wanted	  you	  to	  be	  more	  frustrated	  by	  choosing	  B	  than	  by	  choosing	  A:	  	  	  
                                                
10 Of course, invoking mixed acts requires the theorist to say something about what mixed acts are and 
when they are available to agents.  In particular, does performing a mixed act require the agent to have a 
randomizing device available and to bind herself to taking the option indicated by the randomizing device.  
Since we are neither endorsing nor opposing the use of mix acts in decision theory, we raise this worry only 
to set it aside.  Note also that even if mixed acts are unavailable, one might argue that there is a certain 
doxastic state you could be in (namely 0.5 confidence that you will take A, 0.5 that you will take B), which 
is a stable equilibrium.  See Skyrms (1990) and Arntzenius (2008) for discussion.   
11 See especially Egan (2007). 
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   in	  A	   	   in	  B	   	  
If	  she	  predicted	  you	  would	  take	  Crate	  A,	  then	  she	  put	  	  	  $1000	  	   $1,100	  
If	  she	  predicted	  you	  would	  take	  Crate	  B,	  then	  she	  put	   $1000	  	   $0	  
In	  this	  case	  we	  can	  represent	  the	  recommendations	  of	  CDT	  like	  this:	   	  	  
	   Fig.	  7	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Do	  B!	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Do	  A!	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  A	   	   	   	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  B	   	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	   	  CDT	  says	  that	  if	  you	  are	  certain	  or	  near-­‐certain	  (to	  be	  precise:	  if	  you	  have	  credence	  greater	  than	  1000/1100	  =	  	  0.90)	  that	  you	  will	  take	  Crate	  A,	  then	  you	  ought	  to	  take	  Crate	  B.	  But	  wouldn’t	  it	  be	  crazy	  to	  take	  Crate	  B,	  whatever	  you	  believe?	  You	  know,	  coming	  into	  the	  situation,	  that	  whatever	  you	  do,	  it	  will	  turn	  out	  that	  you	  would	  have	  been	  better	  off	  doing	  the	  other	  thing.	  You	  will	  regret	  your	  choice,	  whatever	  you	  do.	  So	  why	  do	  the	  thing	  with	  the	  terrible	  outcome,	  the	  thing	  you	  will	  really,	  really	  regret?	  	  If	  it	  is	  irrational	  to	  take	  Crate	  B,	  no	  matter	  what	  you	  believe	  about	  what	  you	  will	  do,	  then	  CDT	  is	  wrong,	  since	  it	  says	  that	  you	  ought	  to	  take	  B	  if	  you	  are	  very	  confident	  that	  you	  will	  not	  do	  so.	  	  	  	   Causal	  decision	  theorists	  have	  a	  reply	  to	  this	  objection.13	  	  If	  you	  are	  certain	  that	  you	  will	  take	  Crate	  A,	  and	  so	  you	  are	  certain	  that	  Crate	  A	  contains	  $1,000	  and	  Crate	  B	  $1,100,	  then	  indeed	  you	  ought	  to	  take	  Crate	  B.	  Of	  course	  you	  ought	  to	  take	  Crate	  B	  –	  you	  are	  certain	  that	  it	  contains	  more	  money!	  Now,	  it	  is	  true	  that	  if	  you	  do	  what	  you	  ought	  to	  do	  on	  these	  grounds,	  if	  you	  take	  Crate	  B,	  and	  you	  know	  that	  you	  are	  a	  causal	  decision	  theorist,	  then	  there	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  something	  defective	  about	  
                                                                                                                                            
12 We should note that Egan appeals to different cases: the ‘psycho-button’ case, the ‘murder lesion’ case, . 
But they share the same general form – they are asymmetric self-frustrating cases.  
13 Thanks to Bob Stalnaker for putting this reply to us in a particularly forceful way. 
 19 
you.14	  We	  can	  say:	  “Why	  were	  you	  so	  sure	  of	  something	  that	  turned	  out	  to	  false	  –	  namely,	  that	  you	  were	  going	  to	  take	  Crate	  A?	  Didn’t	  you	  know	  that	  you	  were	  a	  causal	  decision	  theorist?	  Couldn’t	  you	  have	  anticipated	  that	  this	  confidence	  that	  you	  were	  going	  to	  take	  Crate	  A	  would	  lead	  you	  to	  take	  Crate	  B?”	  But,	  if	  there	  is	  a	  defect	  here,	  it	  is	  the	  defect	  that	  comes	  with	  believing	  something	  that	  it	  is	  not	  epistemically	  rational	  to	  believe.	  And	  it	  is	  not	  the	  job	  of	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  subjective	  practical	  ought	  to	  tell	  us	  what	  it	  is	  epistemically	  rational	  for	  you	  to	  believe.	  It	  is	  the	  job	  of	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  subjective,	  practical	  ought	  to	  tell	  us	  what,	  given	  your	  beliefs,	  you	  ought	  to	  do.	  If	  you	  believe,	  against	  all	  evidence,	  that	  your	  mother	  is	  a	  murdering	  psychopath,	  then	  you	  ought	  to	  leave	  her	  house	  immediately.	  If	  you	  believe,	  against	  all	  evidence,	  that	  you	  have	  discovered	  a	  counter-­‐example	  to	  Fermat’s	  Last	  Theorem,	  then	  you	  ought	  to	  alert	  the	  media.	  You	  ought	  to	  do	  these	  things	  no	  matter	  whether	  your	  beliefs	  are	  epistemically	  rational.	  	   The	  general	  point	  is	  that	  it	  is	  no	  mark	  against	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  subjective	  ought	  that	  sometimes	  people	  who	  are	  self	  aware,	  epistemically	  irrational,	  and	  doing	  what	  the	  theory	  says	  they	  ought	  to	  do,	  behave	  in	  odd,	  self-­‐destructive	  ways.	  Sometimes	  odd	  beliefs	  license	  odd	  behavior.	  That	  is	  no	  great	  surprise.	  	  	  
5.	  Our	  Problem	  	   	  	   Our	  problem	  with	  decision-­‐dependent	  decision	  theories	  is	  this:	  	  Followers	  of	  decision-­‐dependent	  theories	  will	  in	  some	  cases	  behave	  in	  odd,	  self-­‐destructive	  ways	  if	  they	  are	  also	  self-­‐aware	  and	  epistemically	  rational.	  They	  will,	  by	  anticipating	  
                                                
14 Note that one might also think that it is simply impossible to do one thing while being near certain that 
you would not do it.   
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features	  of	  the	  very	  decision	  they	  are	  in	  the	  process	  of	  making,	  push	  themselves	  into	  situations	  that	  are	  not	  desirable	  even	  by	  their	  own	  lights.	  In	  this	  way,	  if	  any	  of	  SAD,	  SICK,	  or	  CDT	  is	  true,	  then	  when	  combined	  with	  our	  best	  theories	  of	  epistemic	  rationality,	  we	  wind	  up	  with	  a	  very	  unattractive	  picture	  of	  how	  rational	  agents	  behave.	  So	  much	  the	  worse	  for	  SAD,	  SICK,	  and	  CDT,	  and	  for	  decision-­‐dependence	  more	  generally.	  	  	  	   We	  will	  focus	  here	  on	  a	  case	  in	  which	  CDT,	  when	  combined	  with	  assumptions	  of	  self-­‐awareness	  and	  epistemic	  rationality,	  yields	  unattractive	  results.	  	  Analogous	  cases	  can	  be	  constructed	  for	  SAD	  and	  SICK.	  We	  will	  spare	  you	  those	  details.	  The	  case:	  	   	  	   Three	  Crates	  	   You	  know	  the	  demon	  behaved	  like	  this:	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   in	  A	   	   in	  B	   	   in	  C	  
	   If	  she	  predicted	  A,	  then	  she	  put	  	   $1,000,000	   $1,001,000	   $0	   	   	  
	   If	  she	  predicted	  B,	  then	  she	  put	   $0	  	   	   $0	   	   $1,000	  
	   If	  she	  predicted	  C,	  then	  she	  put	   $0	   	   $0	  	   	   $0	  	  In	  this	  case	  the	  evidentialist	  takes	  Crate	  A,	  guided	  by	  her	  confidence	  that	  she	  will	  get	  $1,000,000	  if	  she	  takes	  A,	  $0	  if	  she	  takes	  B,	  $0	  if	  she	  takes	  C.15	  What	  does	  the	  causalist	  do?	  	  We	  can	  represent	  the	  recommendations	  of	  CDT	  like	  this:	  	  	  
                                                
15 Not all evidentialists would agree with this.  Eells (1981), in arguing that evidentialism can recommend 
one-boxing in the Newcomb Problem (see Section 6), says that the demon’s predictor and the agent’s 
choice will have a common cause, so if the agent (by introspecting) can tell whether what that cause is.  
She will notice a certain ‘tickle,’ so to speak, which is either a common cause of an A-choice and an A-
prediction, or a common cause of a B-choice and a B-prediction, etc.  And then she will in effect be able to 
tell what the demon predicted and then take the box with the most money in it.  Eells’ approach, however, 
seems not to apply in cases where the agent cannot detect whether she has the relevant ‘tickle’ or in cases 
where it is stipulated that the agent’s choice and the demon’s prediction lack a common cause.  In any 
event, we will henceforth consider only versions of evidentialism which do not appeal to Eells’ so-called 
‘tickle defense.’  Our evidentialist is of the sort who embraces one-boxing in the Newcomb Problem.   
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What	  CDT	  recommends	  that	  you	  do	  depends	  on	  what	  you	  believe	  you	  will	  do.	  Roughly:	  If	  you	  are	  certain	  or	  near-­‐certain	  that	  you	  will	  take	  Crate	  A	  or	  Crate	  B,	  then	  CDT	  recommends	  that	  you	  take	  Crate	  B.	  If	  you	  are	  certain	  or	  near-­‐certain	  that	  you	  take	  Crate	  B	  or	  Crate	  C,	  and	  you	  have	  some	  confidence	  that	  you	  will	  take	  Crate	  B,	  then	  CDT	  recommends	  that	  you	  take	  Crate	  C.	  If	  you	  are	  certain	  that	  you	  will	  take	  Crate	  C	  then	  CDT	  says	  that	  all	  three	  options	  are	  equally	  desirable	  and	  permits	  you	  to	  take	  any	  of	  the	  three	  boxes.	  What	  the	  causalist	  does	  depends	  on	  what	  she	  believes	  she	  will	  do.	  	   What	  does	  the	  self-­‐aware	  causalist	  do?	  Let’s	  make	  this	  question	  more	  precise.	  Suppose	  that	  you	  are	  practically	  rational	  by	  the	  standards	  of	  the	  causalist.	  In	  particular,	  suppose	  that	  	   1.	  You	  Respect	  Weak	  Dominance	  If,	  right	  before	  you	  make	  your	  mind,	  you	  are	  sure	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  as	  much	  money	  in	  one	  crate	  as	  in	  another,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  you	  are	  sure	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  as	  much	  in	  the	  other	  as	  in	  the	  one,	  then	  you	  will	  not	  take	  the	  other.	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And	  suppose	  that	  you	  are	  self-­‐aware.	  In	  particular,	  suppose	  that	  right	  before	  you	  make	  up	  your	  mind	  	   2.	  You	  are	  Sure	  that	  you	  Respect	  Weak	  Dominance	  You	  are	  sure	  that	  1	  is	  true.	  	  3.	  Your	  Knowledge	  of	  the	  Contents	  of	  the	  Boxes	  is	  Luminous	  If	  you	  are	  sure/unsure	  that	  money	  is	  distributed	  in	  the	  crates	  in	  a	  certain	  way,	  then	  you	  are	  sure	  that	  you	  are	  sure/unsure	  that	  money	  is	  distributed	  in	  the	  crates	  in	  a	  certain	  way.	  	  4.	  You	  are	  not	  Prone	  to	  Astounding	  Yourself	  If	  you	  are	  sure	  that	  you	  will	  not	  take	  a	  particular	  crate	  then	  you	  will	  not	  take	  that	  crate.	  	  How	  do	  you	  behave	  in	  this	  case,	  if	  all	  this	  is	  true	  of	  you	  –	  if	  you	  are	  practically	  rational	  by	  the	  standards	  of	  the	  causalist,	  and	  self-­‐aware?	  	   You	  take	  Crate	  C.	  	  To	  see	  why,	  first	  notice	  that,	  right	  before	  you	  make	  up	  your	  mind,	  you	  are	  sure	  that	  you	  will	  not	  take	  A.	  Argument:	  Suppose,	  for	  reductio,	  that	  you	  are	  unsure	  that	  you	  will	  not	  take	  A.	  So,	  by	  your	  confidence	  in	  the	  predictor,	  you	  are	  unsure	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  as	  much	  money	  in	  A	  as	  in	  B.	  So,	  by	  the	  description	  of	  the	  case,	  you	  are	  sure	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  as	  much	  money	  in	  B	  as	  in	  A,	  and	  unsure	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  as	  much	  money	  in	  A	  as	  in	  B.	  So,	  by	  3	  Your	  Knowledge	  of	  the	  
Contents	  of	  the	  Boxes	  is	  Luminous,	  you	  are	  sure	  that	  (you	  are	  sure	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  as	  much	  money	  in	  B	  as	  in	  A,	  and	  unsure	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  as	  much	  money	  in	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A	  as	  in	  B).	  So,	  by	  2	  You	  are	  sure	  that	  you	  Respect	  Weak	  Dominance,	  you	  are	  sure	  that	  you	  will	  not	  take	  A	  –	  but	  that’s	  a	  contradiction.	  	   It	  follows	  that,	  right	  before	  you	  make	  up	  your	  mind,	  you	  are	  also	  sure	  that	  you	  will	  not	  take	  B.	  Argument:	  You	  are	  sure	  that	  you	  will	  not	  take	  A.	  So,	  by	  your	  confidence	  in	  the	  predictor,	  you	  are	  sure	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  as	  much	  money	  in	  C	  as	  in	  B.	  Suppose,	  for	  reductio,	  that	  you	  are	  unsure	  that	  you	  will	  not	  take	  B.	  So,	  by	  your	  confidence	  in	  the	  predictor,	  you	  are	  unsure	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  as	  much	  money	  in	  B	  as	  in	  C.	  So,	  by	  3	  Your	  Knowledge	  of	  the	  Contents	  of	  the	  Boxes	  is	  Luminous,	  you	  are	  sure	  that	  (you	  are	  sure	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  as	  much	  money	  in	  C	  as	  in	  B,	  and	  unsure	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  as	  much	  money	  in	  B	  as	  in	  C).	  So,	  by	  2,	  you	  are	  sure	  that	  you	  will	  not	  take	  B	  –	  but	  that’s	  a	  contradiction.	  	   Right	  before	  you	  make	  up	  your	  mind,	  you	  are	  sure	  that	  you	  will	  not	  take	  A	  or	  B.	  
16	  So,	  by	  4	  You	  are	  not	  Prone	  to	  Astounding	  Yourself,	  you	  will	  take	  C.	  If	  you	  are	  rational	  by	  the	  standards	  of	  the	  causalist	  and	  self-­‐aware	  then	  you	  will	  take	  C.17	  	  	  	   We	  think	  that	  speaks	  very	  badly	  for	  rationality-­‐by-­‐the-­‐standards-­‐of-­‐the-­‐causalist.	  	  By	  taking	  Crate	  C,	  the	  self-­‐aware	  causalist	  winds	  up	  with	  the	  princely	  sum	  
                                                
16 We should note that Brian Skyrms and Frank Arntzenius have developed general accounts of what 
epistemically rational, self-aware causalists believe that they will do in situations in which the causal 
decision theoretic expected value of options depends on their beliefs about what they will do. Both 
accounts entail that you ought to end up in a deliberational equilibrium. Your credences about what you 
will do are in deliberational equilibrium iff, given those credences, all of the act-propositions to which you 
assign positive credence have equal causal expected utilities.  Here, the only deliberational equilibrium is 
credence 1 that you will take Box C.  Therefore, both accounts suggest that the epistemically rational, self-
aware causalist will come to believe that she will take C. See Skyrms (1990)  and Arntzenius (2008). 
17 Conditions 1-4 together yield what in game theory is called ‘iterated elimination of (weakly) dominated 
strategies.’  Starting with the initial 3 x 3 decision matrix, we rule out any weakly or strongly dominated 
acts and the proposition that the predictor predicted you would choose that dominated act.  This results in a 
smaller 2 x 2 decision matrix.  Then, we take this 2 x 2 matrix and rule out any dominated acts (along with 
the possibility of the predictor having predicted this action).  And so on.  We invoke conditions 1-4 to show 
why iterated elimination of dominated strategies is legitimate and also to highlight that it is not legitimate if 
the agent is not self-aware.  (We also invoke conditions 1-4 to show that iterated elimination of weakly 
dominated strategies is as defensible as iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies.) 
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of	  $0.	  Worse,	  by	  her	  own	  lights,	  taking	  Crate	  C	  guarantees	  her	  a	  return	  of	  $0.	  That	  is,	  given	  that	  she	  was	  certain	  she	  would	  take	  Crate	  C,	  she	  was	  certain	  that	  Crate	  C	  contained	  $0.	  Of	  course,	  had	  she	  thought	  that	  she	  might	  take	  Crate	  B,	  then	  she	  would	  not	  have	  been	  certain	  that	  Crate	  C	  was	  empty.	  But	  she	  didn’t	  think	  she	  might	  take	  Crate	  B,	  and	  so	  she	  was	  certain	  that	  her	  choice	  of	  Crate	  C	  would	  yield	  $0.	  (Of	  course	  that	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  we	  cannot	  explain	  why	  she	  took	  Crate	  C	  	  –	  if	  she	  had	  taken	  any	  other	  box	  then	  she	  would	  not	  have	  been	  self-­‐aware	  and	  rational.	  It	  is	  just	  to	  say	  that	  in	  explaining	  why	  she	  took	  Crate	  C	  we	  do	  not	  attribute	  to	  her	  any	  motivating	  reason	  to	  take	  Crate	  C.	  She	  did	  not	  take	  herself	  to	  have	  any	  reason	  to	  take	  Crate	  C,	  because,	  having	  convinced	  herself	  that	  the	  demon	  predicted	  she	  would	  take	  Crate	  C,	  she	  was	  certain	  that	  all	  the	  crates	  contained	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  money,	  and	  money,	  by	  hypothesis,	  is	  all	  she	  cared	  about.)	  	   Our	  case	  against	  CDT	  (and	  against	  Decision	  Dependence	  more	  broadly)	  stops	  there.	  	  To	  be	  blunt:	  we	  think	  that	  the	  claim	  that	  a	  practically	  and	  epistemically	  rational	  person	  will	  take	  crate	  C	  in	  these	  circumstances	  is	  strongly	  counterintuitive	  and	  that	  this	  bears	  against	  the	  claim	  that	  CDT	  is	  the	  correct	  theory	  of	  practical	  rationality.18	  	  	  	   But	  we	  can	  also	  dramatize	  the	  problem	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  	  The	  epistemically	  rational	  and	  self-­‐aware	  evidentialist	  takes	  Crate	  A	  and,	  predictably	  enough,	  gets	  $1,000,000,	  while	  the	  epistemically	  rational	  and	  self-­‐aware	  causalist	  takes	  Crate	  C	  
                                                
18 To emphasize, our case against CDT (and decision-dependent theories more broadly) does not rest on 
considering an arbitrary case in which we have stipulated that you start out certain that you will take Box 
C.  Rather, we have demonstrated that if you are a causalist and moreover are epistemically ideal (in the 
sense of being both self-aware and rational in responding to evidence), then you must wind up certain that 
you will take Box C.    
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and,	  predictably	  enough,	  gets	  $0.	  	  Consider	  how	  they	  might	  defend	  their	  rational	  honor:19	  	  Evidentialist:	   I	  took	  Crate	  A	  and,	  predictably	  enough,	  got	  $1,000,000.	  You	  took	  Crate	  C	  and,	  predictably	  enough,	  got	  nothing.	  	  Causalist:	   True,	  I	  am	  poor	  and	  you	  are	  rich.	  But	  consider	  what	  would	  have	  happened	  if	  we	  had	  behaved	  differently.	  If	  you	  had	  done	  as	  I	  did	  then	  you	  would	  have	  been	  still	  richer.	  	  Evidentialist:	  	  No.	  	  I	  have	  $1,000,000.	  	  If	  I	  had	  taken	  Crate	  C,	  as	  you	  did,	  then	  I	  would	  have	  nothing.	  	  	  	  Causalist:	  	   I	  mean	  that	  if	  you	  had	  reasoned	  as	  I	  did	  then	  you	  would	  be	  richer.	  	  	  	  Evidentialist:	   You	  reasoned	  in	  a	  way	  that	  led	  you	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  C	  was	  the	  crate	  to	  take.	  If	  I	  had	  reasoned	  that	  way	  then	  I	  would	  have	  nothing.	  	  Causalist:	   But	  you	  and	  I	  started	  with	  different	  beliefs	  about	  ourselves	  and	  the	  world.	  In	  particular,	  I	  was	  sure	  that	  I	  would	  respect	  Weak	  Dominance,	  so	  I	  was	  sure	  that	  I	  would	  not	  take	  Crate	  A,	  so	  I	  was	  sure	  that	  the	  demon	  had	  not	  predicted	  that	  I	  would	  take	  Crate	  A.	  You	  were	  not	  sure	  that	  you	  would	  respect	  Weak	  Dominance,	  so	  you	  were	  not	  sure	  that	  the	  demon	  had	  not	  predicted	  that	  you	  would	  take	  Crate	  A.	  If	  you	  had	  reasoned	  in	  the	  proper,	  causal	  decision	  theoretic	  way	  from	  there,	  then	  you	  would	  have	  taken	  Crate	  B,	  and	  walked	  away	  with	  $1,001,000.	  
                                                
19 The evidentialist’s charge against the causalist is, of course, the old ‘Why Ain’cha Rich?’ objection 
leveled against two-boxing in the Newcomb Problem (discussed in the next section).  There, the 
evidentialist winds up rich and the causalist winds up poor.  But in the Newcomb Problem, the causalist can 
respond that had she done as the evidentialist did, she would have been poorer, while if the evidentialist 
had done as the causalist did, he (the evidentialist) would have been richer (see Lewis 1999).  As the 
following dialogue shows, however, in Three Boxes, neither counterfactual is true. 
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  Evidentialist:	   If	  I	  had	  done	  all	  that	  then	  I	  would	  not	  have	  been	  self-­‐aware.	  I	  would	  have	  followed	  causal	  decision	  theory	  without	  anticipating	  that	  I	  would	  follow	  causal	  decision	  theory.	  Self-­‐awareness	  is	  an	  epistemic	  virtue,	  lack	  of	  it	  an	  epistemic	  defect.	  	  So,	  yes,	  if	  I	  had	  been	  epistemically	  sub-­‐optimal20,	  but	  practically	  optimal-­‐by-­‐your-­‐standards,	  then	  I	  would	  have	  taken	  Crate	  B,	  and	  walked	  away	  with	  $1,001,000.	  But	  if	  I	  had	  been	  both	  epistemically	  and	  practically	  optimal-­‐by-­‐your-­‐standards,	  if	  I	  had	  been	  the	  very	  model	  of	  epistemic	  and	  practical	  perfection,	  I	  would	  have	  taken	  Crate	  C,	  and	  walked	  away	  with	  nothing.	  	  	  Causalist:	   Ok.	  	  So	  if	  you	  had	  done	  as	  I	  did,	  then	  you	  would	  not	  have	  been	  richer.	  	  But	  still,	  if	  I	  had	  done	  what	  you	  did	  then	  I	  would	  have	  been	  poorer.	  	  Evidentialist:	  No,	  you	  have	  nothing.	  If	  you	  had	  done	  as	  I	  did	  then	  you	  would	  not	  have	  had	  less	  than	  nothing.	  You	  can’t	  have	  less	  than	  nothing.	  	  Causalist:	   Oh,	  right.	  But	  still,	  though	  I	  would	  not	  have	  been	  poorer	  if	  I	  had	  done	  as	  you	  did,	  at	  least	  I	  would	  not	  have	  been	  richer.	  	  Evidentialist:	   Yes,	  you	  would	  have	  been	  no	  richer	  or	  poorer	  if	  you	  had	  behaved	  differently,	  but	  that	  hardly	  illustrates	  that	  you	  behaved	  in	  a	  uniquely	  rational	  way.	  Indeed,	  it	  makes	  your	  behavior	  puzzling.	  Why	  were	  you	  so	  intent	  on	  choosing	  box	  C,	  given	  that,	  as	  you	  chose	  box	  C,	  you	  were	  sure	  that	  it	  contained	  no	  money?	  	  Causalist:	   I	  had	  to	  choose	  one	  of	  the	  crates.	  C	  was	  as	  good	  as	  any.	  	  
                                                
20 Note that even if self-awareness is an epistemic virtue and lack thereof an epistemic defect, it may not be 
the case that one is irrational if one lacks self-awareness, at least so long as being epistemically sub-
optimal does not entail being epistemically irrational. Note also that the type of self-awareness considered 
here (in 2-3 above and 2-4 below) is quite weak and does not require anything approaching complete 
knowledge of one's mental states and future choices.  
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  Evidentialist:	   But	  it	  is	  not	  like	  C	  was	  a	  random	  choice.	  In	  this	  kind	  of	  situation	  you	  
always	  choose	  C.	  	  Causalist:	   Well,	  if	  I	  had	  not	  chosen	  C	  then	  I	  would	  not	  have	  been	  self-­‐aware	  and	  rational.	  	  Evidentialist:	   But	  you	  don’t	  care	  about	  being	  self-­‐aware	  and	  rational.	  You	  only	  care	  about	  money.	  	  	  Causalist:	   I	  am	  self-­‐aware	  and	  rational,	  so	  I	  just…	  do	  it.	  	  Evidentialist:	  	  Curious.	  You	  consistently	  act	  in	  a	  way	  such	  that	  you	  are	  always	  sure	  that	  if	  you	  act	  that	  way	  then	  you	  will	  be	  pennilessness,	  though	  as	  you	  do	  it,	  you	  see	  no	  reason	  to	  do	  it.	  Maybe	  that	  is	  how	  lemmings	  feel	  as	  they	  dive	  off	  of	  sea	  cliffs:	  ‘I	  see	  absolutely	  no	  reason	  to	  do	  this.	  But	  I	  am	  a	  lemming,	  dammit!	  So	  I	  just…	  do	  it.’21	  	  	  The	  causalist	  comes	  off	  very	  badly	  in	  this	  exchange,	  in	  our	  view.	  He	  chose	  to	  do	  something	  that	  not	  only	  had	  no	  ‘news	  value’	  for	  him	  (the	  thing	  that	  evidentialists	  care	  about	  and	  causalists	  do	  not)	  but	  also	  had	  no	  anticipated	  good	  consequences	  
                                                                                                                                            
 
21 The causalist may remain unmoved by the 'Why Ain'cha Rich?' objection. Even if she no longer has 
recourse to the reply that she'd have been poorer and the evidentialist richer had each done what the other 
did, she might still make the reply that the rich evidentialist simply faced a good set of choices while she, 
the causalist, faced a bad set of choices, and she is not to be blamed for having faced a bad set of choices. 
But suppose that despite the causalist’s 100% confidence that the demon would be accurate, the demon in 
fact made the wrong prediction, thinking instead that the causalist would take Crate B.  In this case, the 
causalist takes Crate C and winds up with nothing but cannot blame her pennilessness on having faced a 
bad set of choices.  Rather, she can only blame it on her believing herself to have faced a bad set of choices.  
But the fact that she had this belief cannot be blamed on the demon; any guilt rests entirely with herself.    
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(the	  thing	  that	  causalists	  care	  about	  and	  evidentialists	  do	  not.)	  This	  is	  not	  the	  behavior	  of	  a	  rational	  person.	  	  
6.	  Previous	  ‘Why	  Aincha	  Rich?’	  Arguments	  	   If	  you	  are	  familiar	  with	  the	  history	  of	  the	  debate	  between	  causalists	  and	  evidentialists,	  the	  above	  argument	  may	  remind	  you	  of	  a	  traditional	  ‘Why	  Aincha	  Rich?’	  argument.	  Maybe	  so.	  But	  our	  argument	  is	  better	  than	  any	  previous	  such	  argument.	  We	  will	  explain	  why	  by	  talking	  about	  two	  of	  them.	  	  	  	   	  The	  first,	  most	  famous	  ‘Why	  Aincha	  Rich?’	  argument	  starts	  with	  the	  classic	  Newcomb	  case.	  In	  that	  case	  there	  is	  an	  opaque	  box	  and	  a	  transparent	  box.	  	  You	  have	  to	  choose	  between	  taking	  just	  the	  opaque	  box	  (‘one-­‐boxing’)	  or	  taking	  both	  boxes	  (‘two-­‐boxing’).	  	  You	  see	  there	  to	  be	  $1,000	  in	  the	  transparent	  box,	  but	  cannot	  see	  what	  is	  in	  the	  opaque	  one.	  	  You	  know	  that	  an	  unerringly	  accurate	  predictor	  put	  $1,000,000	  in	  the	  opaque	  box	  if	  she	  predicted	  you	  would	  one-­‐box	  and	  $0	  in	  the	  opaque	  box	  if	  she	  predicted	  you	  would	  two-­‐box.	  	  	   The	  Classic	  Newcomb	  Case	  One	  box	  or	  two	  boxes	  –	  which	  is	  it	  to	  be?	  You	  are	  sure	  that	  the	  unerringly	  accurate	  demon	  proceeded	  like	  this.	   	  	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   in	  1	  box	   in	  2	  boxes	  
If	  she	  predicted	  you	  would	  1-­‐box,	  then	  there	  is	  	  	  $1,000,000	   $1,001,000	  
If	  she	  predicted	  you	  would	  2-­‐box,	  then	  there	  is	  	  $0	   	   $1,000	  	  Evidential	  Decision	  Theory	  recommends	  one-­‐boxing,	  for	  your	  expected	  earnings,	  conditional	  on	  your	  one-­‐boxing,	  are	  $1,000,000,	  whereas	  your	  expected	  earnings,	  conditional	  on	  your	  two-­‐boxing,	  are	  $1,000.	  	  Causal	  Decision	  Theory,	  by	  contrast,	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recommends	  two-­‐boxing,	  for	  you	  are	  certain	  that	  regardless	  of	  what	  the	  predictor	  predicted	  you	  would	  do,	  there	  is	  more	  money	  in	  both	  boxes	  combined	  than	  in	  the	  opaque	  box	  alone.22	  	  	  	   When	  many	  people	  are	  placed	  in	  many	  Newcomb	  cases,	  those	  who	  one-­‐box	  tend	  to	  wind	  up	  with	  $1,000,000,	  whereas	  those	  who	  two-­‐box	  tend	  to	  wind	  up	  with	  $1,000.	  	  Moreover,	  this	  pattern	  is	  perfectly	  foreseeable,	  given	  the	  predictor’s	  accuracy.	  	  ‘So…’	  says	  the	  evidentialist	  to	  the	  causalist	  ‘…if	  you	  people	  are	  so	  rational,	  why	  aincha	  rich?’	  	   The	  causalist	  concedes	  that	  she	  is	  poor,	  but	  blames	  her	  circumstances.	  ‘You	  and	  I	  were	  in	  very	  different	  circumstances.’	  she	  tells	  the	  evidentialist	  ‘I	  made	  the	  best	  of	  mine,	  while	  you	  made	  the	  worst	  of	  yours.	  The	  only	  thing	  we	  learn	  from	  your	  predictable	  riches	  is	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  there	  to	  be	  mechanism	  that	  punishes	  people	  for	  having	  a	  disposition	  to	  behave	  as	  causalism	  recommends	  they	  behave.	  But	  that	  hardly	  tells	  against	  causalism.	  It	  is	  possible	  for	  there	  to	  be	  a	  mechanism	  that	  punishes	  people	  for	  having	  a	  disposition	  to	  behave	  as	  evidentialism	  recommends	  they	  behave	  –	  an	  intuitive	  psychopath	  goes	  around	  bashing	  the	  evidentialists	  on	  the	  head.	  For	  any	  decision	  theory	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  there	  to	  be	  a	  mechanism	  that	  punishes	  its	  followers.’23	  	   No	  progress	  is	  made.	  And	  there	  is	  a	  good	  reason	  for	  this.	  The	  evidentialist	  and	  causalist	  may	  agree	  that	  a	  decision	  theory	  should	  be	  judged	  on	  whether	  it	  following	  it	  will,	  predictably,	  yield	  better	  results	  in	  relevantly	  similar	  cases,	  but	  they	  disagree	  on	  what	  cases	  count	  as	  ‘relevantly	  similar.’	  For	  the	  causalist,	  cases	  are	  relevantly	  
                                                
22 Actually, it is not quite as straightforward as this for CDT to recommend two-boxing, as we explain in 
the next section.   
23 Gibbard and Harper (1978), Lewis (1999). 
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similar	  when	  they	  are	  similar	  with	  respect	  to	  factors	  outside	  of	  the	  agent’s	  control.	  So,	  for	  example,	  though	  two	  cases	  in	  which	  there	  is	  nothing	  in	  the	  opaque	  box	  may	  be	  relevantly	  similar,	  a	  case	  in	  which	  there	  is	  nothing	  in	  the	  opaque	  box	  is	  not	  relevantly	  similar	  to	  a	  case	  in	  which	  there	  $1,000,000	  in	  the	  opaque	  box.	  Within	  classes	  of	  cases	  that	  are	  relevantly	  similar	  in	  this	  way	  causalists,	  predictably,	  tend	  to	  do	  better	  than	  evidentialists.	  For	  the	  evidentialist,	  cases	  are	  relevantly	  similar	  when	  they	  are	  similar	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  doxastic	  state	  of	  the	  agent.	  So,	  for	  example,	  when	  the	  evidentialist	  and	  the	  causalist	  find	  themselves	  in	  a	  Newcomb	  case,	  they	  are	  (no	  matter	  what	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  boxes	  are)	  in	  relevantly	  similar	  cases.	  Within	  classes	  of	  cases	  that	  relevantly	  similar	  in	  this	  way	  evidentialists,	  predictably,	  tend	  to	  do	  better	  than	  causalists.	  	   A	  second	  sort	  of	  ‘Why	  Aincha	  Rich’	  argument,	  this	  time	  against	  the	  evidentialist,	  has	  recently(ish)	  been	  proposed	  by	  Frank	  Arntzenius	  (2008).	  His	  goal	  is	  to	  imagine	  a	  case	  in	  which,	  in	  very	  similar	  betting	  situations,	  causalists	  come	  out	  better	  than	  evidentialists.24	  	  	  	   Yankees	  or	  Red	  Sox?	  The	  Yankees	  are	  playing	  the	  Red	  Sox.	  You	  know	  the	  Yankees	  win	  90%	  of	  the	  time.	  You	  must	  bet	  on	  one	  team.	  A	  bet	  on	  the	  Yankees	  will	  win	  you	  $1	  if	  they	  win,	  lose	  you	  $2	  if	  they	  lose.	  A	  bet	  on	  the	  Red	  Sox	  will	  win	  you	  $2	  if	  they	  win,	  lose	  you	  $1	  if	  they	  lose.	  It	  would	  seem	  like	  betting	  on	  the	  Yankees	  is	  the	  way	  forward,	  but	  there’s	  a	  wrinkle.	  Before	  you	  decide	  
                                                
24 As we explain below in the next footnote, Arntzenius’s case for the causalist predictably doing better 
than the evidentialist crucially relies on his stipulation that the causalist in his case is non-self-aware, not 
realizing that she is one who follows causalism.  Lewis (1999) gives a proof to the effect that there cannot 
be a ‘Why Aincha Rich?’ objection leveled against evientialism, but his proof relies on the stipulation that 
all parties are self-aware, knowing their credences and utilities and also knowing which decision theory 
they follow.   
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which	  team	  to	  bet	  on,	  a	  reliable	  predictor	  tells	  you	  whether	  you	  will	  win	  or	  lose.	  She	  says	  either	  ‘You	  will	  win	  your	  next	  bet’	  or	  ‘You	  will	  lose	  your	  next	  bet.’	  	  	  	   An	  evidentialist	  in	  your	  position	  bets	  on	  the	  Red	  Sox,	  no	  matter	  what	  the	  prediction.	  That	  is	  because,	  conditional	  on	  the	  proposition	  that	  you	  next	  bet	  will	  win,	  a	  bet	  on	  the	  Red	  Sox	  wins	  $2,	  while	  a	  bet	  on	  the	  Yankees	  wins	  $1.	  Similarly,	  conditional	  on	  the	  proposition	  that	  your	  next	  bet	  will	  lose,	  a	  bet	  on	  the	  Red	  Sox	  loses	  $1,	  while	  a	  bet	  on	  the	  Yankees	  loses	  $2.	  	  So	  evidentialists	  always	  bet	  on	  the	  Red	  Sox,	  and	  predictably	  enough,	  do	  badly,	  since	  the	  Yankees	  win	  90%	  of	  the	  time.	  	  	  	   By	  contrast,	  according	  to	  Arntzenius,	  a	  causalist	  in	  your	  position	  bets	  on	  the	  Yankees,	  no	  matter	  the	  prediction.	  Crucially,	  he	  assumes	  that	  the	  caualist	  ‘does	  not	  know	  he	  is	  a	  causal	  decision	  theorist,	  indeed	  that	  he	  has	  no	  credences	  about	  which	  bet	  he	  will	  take	  out	  when	  he	  calculates	  his	  causal	  utilities’	  (2008,	  fn	  10).	  	  (We	  have	  serious	  qualms	  about	  how	  this	  stipulation	  affects	  the	  dialectic25,	  but	  let	  us	  grant	  it	  for	  now.)	  	  Given	  this	  stipulation,	  the	  causalist	  effectively	  ignores	  the	  predictor’s	  statement	  and	  takes	  the	  two	  relevant	  dependency	  hypotheses	  to	  be	  ‘Yankees	  win’	  
                                                
25 This stipulation is crucial, and also contentious.  Arntzenius cannot get the result that the causalist will 
always bet on the Yankees, and hence that the causalist will predictably do better than the evidentialist in 
the long run, without it.  For if the causalist is self-aware, then which bet he will take depends on what he 
starts out thinking that he will do.  Suppose, for instance, that he starts off (for some reason) confident that 
he will bet on the Red Sox.  Then, if the predictor tells him that he will win his next bet, then because he 
knows he is confident that he’ll bet on the Red Sox, this gives him more evidence that the Red Sox will 
win, and also thereby gives him yet more reason to bet on the Red Sox.  In effect, being told that he’ll win 
his next bet puts the causalist in a case of self-reinforcing decision-dependence – whatever he starts off 
thinking he’ll do, being told he’ll win his next bet gives him yet more reason to do that thing.  By contrast, 
being told that he’ll lose his next bet puts the causalist in a case of self-frustrating decision-dependence – if 
he starts off thinking he’ll bet on the Yankees, the prediction gives him evidence that the Red Sox will win 
and hence gives him reason to bet on the Red Sox, and similarly, mutatis mutandis for the case where he 
starts off thinking he’ll bet on the Red Sox.  What this means is that if we drop the stipulation that the 
causalist we are considering is non-self-aware, then we cannot get Arntzenius’ desired result that the 
evidentialist predictably does worse than the causalist.  Of course, it remains the case that the evidentialist 
would do better by becoming a non-self-aware causalist.  Indeed, in the dialogue between the evidentialist 
and the causalist, we noted that the evidentialist in the Three Crates case would do better by taking Box B, 
but that doing so would only by licensed by CDT if she maintained some credence that she would take Box 
A, i.e. if she followed CDT without being aware that she was doing so.  But given that non-self-awareness 
is an epistemic defect, it seems a poor defense of causalism to say that the evidentialist does worse than the 
non-self-aware causalist.     
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and	  ‘Yankees’	  lose,	  assigning	  0.9	  credence	  to	  the	  former,	  0.1	  credence	  to	  the	  latter.	  That	  gives	  betting	  on	  the	  Yankees	  higher	  causal	  expected	  utility	  than	  betting	  on	  the	  Red	  Sox.	  So	  causalists	  always	  bet	  on	  the	  Yankees,	  and	  predictably	  enough	  do	  well,	  since	  the	  Yankees	  win	  90%	  of	  the	  time.	  	  	  	   But	  as	  with	  the	  initial	  ‘Why	  Aincha	  Rich?’	  objection	  in	  the	  Newcomb	  Problem,	  Arntzenius’	  version	  of	  the	  objection,	  this	  time	  raised	  against	  evidentialism,	  is	  inconclusive.	  	  The	  evidentialist	  will	  insist	  that	  we	  need	  to	  compare	  relative	  performance	  on	  cases	  that	  are	  relevantly	  similar,	  which	  for	  the	  evidentialist	  means	  cases	  that	  are	  alike	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  agent’s	  doxastic	  or	  evidential	  state.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  then,	  we	  need	  to	  compare	  how	  they	  do	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  predictor	  has	  said	  ‘You	  will	  win	  your	  next	  bet,’	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  cases	  where	  the	  predictor	  has	  said	  ‘You	  will	  lose	  your	  next	  bet,’	  on	  the	  other.	  	  But	  in	  each	  sort	  of	  case,	  the	  evidentialist	  does	  better	  than	  the	  causalist.	  	  In	  the	  former	  sort	  of	  case,	  the	  evidentialist	  wins	  $2	  from	  betting	  on	  the	  Red	  Sox,	  while	  the	  causalist	  wins	  $1	  from	  betting	  on	  the	  Yankees.	  	  In	  the	  latter,	  the	  evidentialist	  loses	  $1	  from	  betting	  on	  the	  Red	  Sox,	  while	  the	  causalist	  loses	  $2	  from	  betting	  on	  the	  Yankees.	  In	  ‘relevantly	  similar’	  situations	  evidentialists,	  predictably,	  do	  better	  than	  causalists.26	   	  	   So	  both	  ‘Why	  Aincha	  Richa?’	  arguments	  yield	  a	  stalemate.	  	  The	  evidentialist	  says	  that	  when	  we	  look	  at	  what	  she	  regards	  as	  relevantly	  similar	  cases,	  we	  see	  that,	  predictably,	  she	  does	  better	  than	  the	  causalist,	  while	  the	  causalist	  says	  that	  when	  we	  
                                                
26 Is it nevertheless true that in cases that are alike with respect to factors beyond the agent’s control, the 
causalist does better?  No.  In cases where the Yankees win, it is true that the causalist does better (winning 
$1, while the evidentialist loses $1), but in cases where the Red Sox win, the evidentialist does better than 
the causalist (winning $2, while the causalist loses $2).  The reason the evidentialist does worse overall 
than the causalist is that cases where the Yankees win are so much more frequent than cases where the Red 
Sox win.    
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look	  at	  what	  she	  regards	  as	  relevant	  similar	  cases,	  we	  see	  that,	  predictably,	  she	  does	  better	  than	  the	  evidentialist.	  	  	  	   The	  objection	  that	  we	  raise	  against	  Causal	  Decision	  Theory	  (and	  all	  theories	  that	  endorse	  Decision	  Dependence),	  based	  on	  the	  Three	  Crates	  case,	  yields	  no	  such	  stalemate.	  Recall	  that	  case:	  	   	   Three	  Crates	  	   You	  know	  the	  demon	  behaved	  like	  this:	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   in	  A	   	   in	  B	   	   in	  C	  
	   If	  she	  predicted	  A,	  then	  she	  put	  	   $1,000,000	   $1,001,000	   $0	   	   	  
	   If	  she	  predicted	  B,	  then	  she	  put	   $0	  	   	   $0	   	   $1,000	  
	   If	  she	  predicted	  C,	  then	  she	  put	   $0	   	   $0	  	   	   $0	  	  	  Let	  the	  evidentialist	  and	  the	  causalist	  each	  operate	  with	  her	  preferred	  conception	  of	  relevant	  similarity	  of	  cases.	  The	  evidentialist	  can	  say	  that	  in	  relevantly-­‐similar-­‐in-­‐her-­‐way	  cases	  (similar	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  doxastic	  state	  of	  the	  agent)	  evidentialists,	  predictably,	  do	  better	  than	  causalists.	  All	  Three	  Crates	  cases	  are	  relevantly	  similar	  in	  this	  way,	  and	  in	  these	  cases	  the	  evidentialist	  always	  gets	  $1,000,000	  while	  the	  causalist	  always	  gets	  $0.	  But	  the	  causalist	  cannot	  say	  that	  in	  relevantly-­‐similar-­‐in-­‐her-­‐way	  cases	  (cases	  similar	  with	  respect	  to	  things	  outside	  of	  the	  agent’s	  control)	  causalists	  (who	  always	  take	  box	  C),	  predictably,	  do	  better	  than	  evidentialists	  (who	  always	  take	  A).	  In	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  demon	  predicted	  A,	  evidentialists	  do	  much,	  much	  better	  than	  causalists.	  In	  cases	  which	  the	  demon	  predicted	  C,	  evidentialists	  and	  causalists	  do	  equally	  badly	  (as	  we	  emphasized	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  this	  is	  partly	  what	  makes	  the	  causalist’s	  behavior	  so	  odd	  –	  she	  takes	  Box	  C	  while	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recognizing	  that	  even	  by	  causalist	  lights,	  she	  has	  no	  more	  reason	  to	  take	  C	  than	  to	  take	  A	  or	  B;	  it	  is	  just	  that	  were	  she	  to	  take	  one	  of	  the	  other	  boxes,	  she	  would	  either	  fail	  to	  be	  self-­‐knowing,	  or	  fail	  to	  be	  epistemically	  rational,	  or	  fail	  to	  obey	  causalism).	  Only	  in	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  demon	  predicted	  B	  do	  causalists	  do	  better	  than	  evidentialists	  –	  but	  both	  causalists	  and	  evidentialists	  know	  they	  are	  not	  in	  such	  a	  case.	  	  	  	  	   No	  stalemate.	  	  	  
7.	  Decision	  Dependence	  and	  the	  Newcomb	  Problem	  	   Let	  us	  end	  by	  facing	  the	  Newcomb	  problem	  head-­‐on	  and	  looking	  at	  how	  our	  argument	  that	  the	  subjective	  ought	  is	  not	  decision-­‐dependent	  bears	  upon	  it.	  	  	  	   First,	  note	  that	  the	  Newcomb	  Case	  is	  not	  a	  case	  in	  which	  CDT	  yields	  Decision	  Dependence.	  	  For	  CDT	  favors	  two-­‐boxing	  no	  matter	  what	  credences	  you	  have	  concerning	  what	  you	  will	  do.	  No	  matter	  what	  credences	  you	  have	  concerning	  what	  you	  will	  do,	  the	  causal	  expected	  utility	  of	  two-­‐boxing	  is	  $1,000	  greater	  than	  the	  causal	  expected	  utility	  of	  one-­‐boxing.27	  	   The	  problem	  with	  CDT	  is	  that,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  it	  yields	  Decision	  Dependence	  in	  
other	  cases.	  As	  a	  result	  it	  says	  that	  a	  practically	  and	  epistemically	  rational	  person	  will	  take	  Crate	  C	  in	  the	  Three	  Crates	  case.	  That	  raises	  a	  question:	  Can	  we	  save	  the	  intuition	  that	  two-­‐boxing	  is	  the	  thing	  to	  do	  in	  the	  Newcomb	  Problem	  by	  coming	  up	  with	  another	  theory	  of	  practical	  rationality,	  some	  variant	  of	  CDT	  as	  standardly	  
                                                
27A qualification: as many commentators have noticed, if your credences concerning what you will do are 
undefined then in this case your credences concerning dependency hypotheses are undefined and the causal 
expected utilities of the options open to you are undefined. The point is that so long as you have credences 
concerning what you will do, the causal expected utility of two-boxing is greater than the causal expected 
utility of one-boxing. 
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understood,	  that	  tells	  us	  that	  a	  rational	  person	  will	  two-­‐box	  in	  the	  Newcomb	  Case	  but	  does	  not	  tell	  us	  that	  a	  rational	  person	  will	  take	  Crate	  C	  in	  the	  Three	  Crates	  case?	  	   We	  think	  the	  answer	  is	  no.	  There	  is	  no	  good	  theory	  of	  practical	  rationality	  with	  both	  these	  features.	  Two-­‐boxing	  and	  taking-­‐Crate-­‐C	  stand	  or	  fall	  together.	  	  	  	   We	  will	  not	  try	  to	  survey	  all	  possible	  attempts	  to	  devise	  a	  good	  theory	  of	  practical	  rationality	  with	  both	  features.	  That	  would	  be	  an	  endless	  game	  of	  whack-­‐a-­‐mole.	  Instead,	  we	  will	  aim	  for	  a	  general	  argument.28	  	  	  	   To	  illustrate	  the	  idea,	  consider	  a	  sample	  theory	  that	  recommends	  two-­‐boxing	  but	  not	  decision-­‐dependence.	  In	  the	  Newcomb	  case,	  though	  the	  causal	  expected	  values	  of	  the	  options	  vary	  with	  your	  credences	  concerning	  what	  you	  will	  do,	  two-­‐boxing	  always	  has	  higher	  causal	  expected	  value	  than	  one-­‐boxing.	  So	  a	  natural	  first	  suggestion	  might	  be:	  	  	  	  	   Supervaluationist	  CDT	  You	  ought	  not	  to	  take	  an	  option	  iff	  there	  is	  some	  other	  option	  such	  that,	  no	  matter	  what	  credences	  you	  might	  have	  about	  what	  you	  will	  do,	  it	  has	  higher	  causal	  expected	  utility.29	  	  	  This	  theory	  gives	  no	  recommendation	  between	  options	  in	  all	  cases	  where	  standard	  causal	  decision	  theory	  yields	  decision	  dependence	  between	  those	  options.	  But	  it	  says	  you	  ought	  not	  to	  one-­‐box	  in	  the	  Newcomb	  case.	  	  	  
                                                
28 Egan (2007) surveys and rejects a number of modified decision theories designed to yield two-boxing 
without giving counterintuitive results in a number of other cases.  But he does not give a general argument 
that there can be no such decision theory.  Briggs (2010) gives an Arrow-style argument that there are 
certain plausible constraints on rational decisions (including the constraint of respecting dominance 
reasoning) such that no decision theory can satisfy all the constraints together.   
29 More precisely, consider all the credences functions obtainable from your present credences by Jeffrey 
Conditionalizing with different credence distributions over the relevant act-propositions.  If, relative to all 
of these new credence functions, one act-proposition has higher causal expected utility than another, then 
you ought not make true the other.   
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   The	  problem	  with	  this	  theory	  is	  that	  sometimes	  it	  fails	  to	  take	  into	  account	  relevant	  evidence.	  Consider	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  the	  Newcomb	  case	  in	  which	  you	  have	  not	  two,	  but	  three	  options:	  one-­‐boxing,	  two-­‐boxing,	  and	  taking	  a	  pistol	  and	  
shooting	  yourself	  in	  the	  knee.	  And	  suppose	  that	  if	  the	  predictor	  predicted	  that	  you	  would	  shoot	  yourself,	  then	  she	  put	  a	  little	  demand	  notice	  for	  $1,001	  underneath	  the	  visible	  $1,000	  in	  the	  transparent	  box,	  making	  one-­‐boxing	  ever	  so	  slightly	  more	  attractive	  than	  two-­‐boxing.	  	  	   Newcomb	  Plus	  Pain	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  by	  1-­‐boxing	   	  by	  2-­‐boxing	  	   by	  shooting	  	   If	  she	  predicted	  1-­‐box,	  then	  you	  get	   $1,000,000	   $1,001,000	   pain	   	  	   If	  she	  predicted	  2-­‐box,	  then	  you	  get	   $0	   	   $1,000	   	   pain	  	   If	  she	  predicted	  shoot,	  then	  you	  get	   $1,00,000	   $999,999	   pain	  	  In	  this	  case	  Supervaluationist	  CDT	  yields	  that	  you	  ought	  not	  to	  shoot	  yourself	  in	  the	  knee,	  but	  not	  that	  you	  ought	  to	  one-­‐box	  and	  not	  that	  you	  ought	  to	  two-­‐box.	  If	  you	  assign	  sufficiently	  low	  credence	  to	  the	  proposition	  that	  you	  will	  shoot	  yourself	  in	  the	  knee	  (below	  around	  0.99999)	  then	  two-­‐boxing	  has	  higher	  expected	  utility	  than	  one-­‐boxing.	  If	  you	  assign	  sufficiently	  high	  credence	  to	  the	  proposition	  that	  you	  will	  shoot	  yourself	  in	  the	  (above	  around	  0.99999)	  then	  one-­‐boxing	  has	  higher	  expected	  utility	  than	  two-­‐boxing.	  	   This	  is	  a	  very	  bad	  result.	  You	  know	  that	  you	  are	  not	  going	  to	  shoot	  yourself	  in	  the	  knee.	  That	  would	  be	  crazy.	  You	  are	  not	  crazy.	  So	  you	  know	  that	  there	  is	  no	  demand	  notice	  in	  the	  transparent	  box.	  It	  follows,	  we	  say,	  that	  you	  should	  treat	  this	  like	  the	  standard	  Newcomb	  case.	  If	  you	  are	  convinced	  that	  you	  ought	  to	  two-­‐box	  in	  the	  standard	  Newcomb	  case,	  you	  should	  likewise	  be	  convinced	  that	  you	  ought	  to	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two-­‐box	  in	  this	  modified	  case.	  By	  ignoring	  your	  conviction	  that	  you	  will	  not	  choose	  to	  shoot	  yourself,	  Supervaluationist	  CDT	  is	  ignoring	  relevant	  evidence	  about	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  boxes,	  relevant	  evidence	  about	  the	  causal	  consequences	  of	  your	  actions.	  	  	  	   But	  the	  reasoning	  we	  have	  employed	  here	  (if	  you	  are	  rational	  then	  you	  will	  know	  you	  are	  not	  going	  to	  shoot	  yourself,	  so	  you	  will	  be	  epistemically	  licensed	  to	  ‘cross	  out’	  the	  far-­‐right	  column	  and	  the	  bottom	  row	  in	  Newcomb	  Plus	  Pain,	  and	  once	  you	  have	  done	  that,	  you	  will	  see	  that	  two-­‐boxing	  has	  higher	  causal	  expected	  utility	  than	  one-­‐boxing)	  is	  just	  the	  same	  as	  the	  reasoning	  that	  yielded	  taking	  Crate	  C	  in	  Three	  Crates	  (if	  you	  are	  rational	  then	  you	  will	  know	  you	  are	  not	  going	  to	  take	  Crate	  A,	  so	  you	  will	  be	  epistemically	  licensed	  to	  ‘cross	  out’	  out	  the	  associated	  row	  and	  column	  in	  the	  decision	  matrix,	  and	  from	  there	  you	  will	  infer	  that	  you	  will	  not	  take	  Crate	  B,	  and	  so	  be	  licensed	  to	  ‘cross	  out’	  the	  row	  and	  column	  for	  Crate	  B	  as	  well).	  	  In	  each	  case,	  you	  have	  evidence	  about	  which	  actions	  you	  will	  or	  will	  not	  perform,	  and	  this	  evidence	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  causal	  consequences	  of	  the	  other	  actions.	  	  Why	  does	  this	  evidence	  have	  no	  bearing	  on	  what	  you	  ought	  to	  do?	  	  	  	   	  This	  does	  not	  just	  point	  to	  a	  problem	  for	  a	  particular	  theory,	  Supervaluationist	  CDT.	  It	  also	  points	  to	  a	  more	  general	  argument	  that	  two-­‐boxing	  in	  the	  Newcomb	  Problem	  and	  taking	  Crate	  C	  in	  Three	  Crates	  stand	  or	  fall	  together:	  	  The	  root	  motivation	  behind	  two-­‐boxing	  in	  the	  Newcomb	  Problem	  is	  that	  actions	  ought	  to	  be	  evaluated	  based	  on	  their	  anticipated	  causal	  consequences.	  	  And	  it	  is	  an	  important	  fact	  about	  rationality	  that	  you	  ought	  to	  take	  into	  account	  your	  total	  evidence	  in	  determining	  what	  to	  believe	  or	  do.	  But	  these	  two	  things	  –	  focusing	  on	  causal	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consequences	  and	  taking	  into	  account	  total	  evidence	  –	  are	  all	  that	  is	  required	  to	  yield	  that	  a	  practically	  and	  epistemically	  rational	  person	  will	  take	  Crate	  C	  in	  Three	  Crates.	  	  So	  you	  can’t	  have	  two-­‐boxing	  be	  rational	  in	  the	  Newcomb	  Problem	  without	  also	  having	  taking	  Crate	  C	  be	  rational	  in	  Three	  Crates.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  you	  agree	  with	  us	  that	  taking	  Crate	  C	  is	  irrational,	  you	  must	  think	  that	  two-­‐boxing	  is	  irrational	  too.	  	  	  
	  
8.	  Wrapping	  Up	  	   Decision-­‐dependence	  is	  a	  curious	  feature	  of	  a	  number	  of	  theories	  of	  practical	  rationality.	  	  Causal	  Decision	  Theory	  is	  the	  most	  famous	  such	  theory,	  but	  there	  are	  others,	  like	  SAD,	  which	  exhorts	  you	  to	  defer	  to	  your	  anticipated	  future	  desires,	  and	  SICK,	  which	  tells	  you	  to	  do	  what	  you	  believe	  will	  be	  good	  for	  your	  children.	  	  	  	   Our	  view	  about	  Decision-­‐Dependence	  is	  this:	  We	  want	  our	  best	  theories	  of	  practical	  rationality	  to	  hook	  up	  with	  our	  best	  theories	  of	  epistemic	  rationality,	  so	  as	  to	  allow	  us	  to	  paint	  an	  attractive	  picture	  of	  what	  someone	  who	  is	  rational	  in	  all	  epistemic	  and	  practical	  respects	  believes,	  desires	  and	  does.	  But,	  if	  any	  of	  SAD,	  SICK	  or	  CDT	  is	  true,	  then	  sometimes	  people	  who	  are	  ideal	  in	  all	  epistemic	  and	  practical	  respects,	  by	  taking	  into	  account	  evidence	  about	  the	  likely	  outcome	  of	  their	  present	  deliberation,	  end	  up	  compelled	  to	  perform	  actions	  that	  are	  no-­‐good-­‐by-­‐the-­‐lights-­‐of-­‐anybody.	  This	  is	  bad	  news	  for	  SAD,	  SICK	  and	  CDT,	  bad	  news	  for	  Decision-­‐Dependence	  more	  generally,	  and	  bad	  news	  for	  two-­‐boxers	  in	  Newcomb	  Cases.	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